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Disengagement from radical organizations. A process and multi-level 
model of analysis 
Olivier Fillieule, in Bert Klandermans and Cornelius van Stralen, Movements 
in times of transition, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press. 
« Their behavior has been blamed on all kinds of social and psychological factors… a social common 
denominator seems out of the question, but it is true that psychologically this generation seems 
everywhere characterized by sheer courage, an astounding will to action, and by no less astounding 
confidence in the possibility of change. But these qualities are not causes » Hannah Arendt, On violence, 
NY, Harvest, 1969 : 15-16, quoted in Horgan (2009 :4). 
 
Introduction 
 
While research on political activism has essentially raised the question of 
recruitment and the enrollment of new activists, it has said very little until 
recently on defection and disengagement. Many factors explain this situation. 
For example, activism itself has been less studied from microsociological 
perspectives than through analysis of the organizations encompassing it, 
which naturally leads to reasoning in terms of current assets rather than in 
terms of flux. Moreover, microsociological approaches to individual behavior, 
except in their economicist version of rational choice theory, have long been 
dismissed in the name of collective behavior theory, also due to the scarcity of 
available sources for those who were, nonetheless, interested in the 
engagement and disengagement of activists. By definition, ‘ex’-activists are no 
longer there at the time of study, and very often organizations do not keep or 
make readily available the membership files that would offer hope of finding 
people who had defected. Further, there is the difficulty in moving from 
snapshots of reality to a processual perspective, which in cases of this sort 
requires longitudinal studies, whether retrospective or, ideally, prospective 
(Fillieule 2001). 
However, in broadening the range of literature to review related fields, the 
spectrum of potentially relevant research widens. If we exclude the 
autobiographical works of priests, terrorists and communist activists, 
literature that more or less directly broaches the question of disengagement 
emerges from the sociology of roles, in the Mertonian or interactionist 
tradition, especially in literature on churches and cults, but also divorce and 
professions (Vaughan 1986; Fuchs-Ebaugh 1988). In the same theoretical 
vein, a number of studies address various aspects of how individuals join and 
leave different types of clandestine, reclusive and stigmatized groups, namely 
by describing several stages in the disaffiliation process. One can mention a 
research tradition in psycho-sociology that focuses on group dynamics within 
terrorist groups (Wasmund 1986 ; Jamieson 1990 ; Crenshaw 1991 ; Taylor 
and Horgan 2006 ;  Horgan 2009), but also on leaving racist and right wing 
movements (Fangen 1999, Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). Lastly, in the 
field of criminology and deviance theory, one should mention research on 
desistance from criminal lifestyle and the theory of differential association and 
the rich literature on criminal youth gangs which provide a significant source 
of insight to understand the links between life course and disengagement from 
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violent/criminal activities (Vigil 1988 ; Klein 1995 ; Decker and Lauritsen 
1996, and Grenne and Pravis 2007 for a review).  
More recently, some scholars have turned to disengagement process in social 
movements, with a dominant focus on radical movements. (e.g. Della Porta 
1992, 1995 ; Klandermans 1997 ; Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule 2003 ; 
Fillieule 2005, 2010 ; Leclercq 2008, etc.) Indeed, more and more social 
movements scholars maintain that there is no difference in nature between 
the reasoning and determinants of conventional law-abiding political protests, 
and illegal and violent forms of action, hence contending it’s certainly fruitful 
to have recourse to a social movement approach towards radical organizations 
and violent political action that would consider it as forms of contentious 
politics, analyzable with the existing conceptual tools of social movement 
theory (Bennani Chraïbi and Fillieule 2003. See also Della Porta 1992, 1995 ; 
Goodwin 2004, 2006; Beck 2008).  
At the same time, research specifically dedicated to radical organizations, in 
the rather broad field of “terrorism studies”, are more and more distancing 
themselves with outdated theoretical models, whether analyses borrowing 
their structure from studies on relative deprivation and collective behavior 
(e.g. Testas 2004; Gurr and Björgo, 2005)1 or, worse still, from a 
psychopathology depicting radical activists as “abnormal” (see Silke 2003 for 
a critical review of such literature). Actually, these  renewed approaches take 
a route which is closer to contemporary social movement theory and produce 
extremely interesting results. (Taylor and Horgan 2006 ; Horgan 2005 ; Gayer 
and jaffrelot 2008 ; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009 ; Horgan 2009 ; Gayer 2009 ; Bosi 
forthcoming) 
In this chapter, I propose an interactionist model of activist withdrawal which 
is based both on the sociology of social movements and contemporary studies 
on terrorism. I have recently developed and formulated empirically this 
theoretical model  in various publications. (Fillieule 2005; Fillieule and Broqua 
2005; Fillieule 2010) Therefore, I will not discuss again all these elements. My 
aim is twofold here : First of all, I argue that such an approach offers a solid 
basis for building a process and multi-level model of disengagement ; second, I 
contend that it is particularly well suited to understand the peculiarities of 
disengagement from radical organizations.2  
In what follows I start by exposing a process and multi level approach of 
disengagement from activist careers, based on an interactionist and 
configurational approach. I then turn to an exploration of the intrication of the 
macro, meso and micro levels in understanding disengagement. To doing this, 
one must abandon macro-level theories and focuss on the complex interplay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Asel, Fair and Shellman (2008) for an approach that focuses more on the motive of relative 
frustration than on objective indicators of frustration. Nonetheless, Fair (2008) on Pakistani activists, 
and Roy (2008) develop a well supported critique of all the attempts to associate the terrorist 
commitment of the jihadis to socio-economic factors. 2	  By radical organization, I am referring to any form of organization ready to operate outside of the legal 
framework and to resort to violence, whether because it feels that the conventional forms of action are 
ineffective, or because repression leaves no other alternative than violence or the dissolution of the 
group. By violent action, I mean a vast array of more or less long lasting or extreme forms of 
commitment, including violence against oneself (e.g. immolation, suicide attacks) or against others (e.g. 
assassination, so called ‘terrorist’ acts, guerilla, etc). Disengagement from radical organizations is 
certainly one of the central social phenomenon that takes place in post revolutionary situations and 
democratic transitions. 
	   3	  
between the activists’ motivations for involvement and disengagement and 
organizational dynamics, structural factors and political opportunities being 
only considered at a second step in order to contextualize micro and meso 
dynamics. Only few research have chosen to focuss on individual activists, 
ther motives and how their motives are tightly linked to organizational 
dynamics.3 To unpack the web of relations between micro- or individual level 
dynamics of commitment and meso- or organizational level factors, I focuss on 
two central dimensions : the complex effects of organizational modeling on 
individuals and the ambivalent effects of repression on organizations as well 
as on individuals. I will show that organizational molding is key to the 
understanding of meso/micro interactions  and that exploration of the effects 
of repression on individuals is a good entry point to grasp the complex web of 
interactions between macro and micro levels (the individual effects of 
repression) and between macro and meso levels (effects of repression on 
organizational forms and strategies). 
 
Leaving militantism behind. Some answers, more questions 
 
Literature that has considered disengagement is mostly interested in ‘total 
institutions’, ‘high-risk’ activism, and ‘extra-legal’ activities, suggesting that 
we should pause and recognize the diversity of phenomena to which this term 
refers. Indeed, the process of disengagement is highly likely to vary as a 
function of what provokes it, the cost of defection, the manner in which it 
takes place, and therefore what becomes of those who leave. 
 
Disengagement as a multifaceted phenomenon 
Defection is not always voluntary. It may result from the dissolution of a 
collective, from the decline of a movement, producing orphans in a cycle of 
mobilization, as Verta Taylor illustrates with regard to post-war American 
feminism (1989); from exclusion; from extraction/de-programming (Beckford, 
1978), or even from a forced exit through exile or, for example, a prison 
sentence. To these situations one must add the number of cases where a 
revolutionary movement leads to a change of regime, as in most democratic 
transitions, and therefore a conversion and institutionalization of protest 
organizations. 
The cost of leaving relates primarily to the manner in which organizations 
frame defection through various constraints. As we have emphasized 
elsewhere, « the psychic or material cost of defection, and therefore its 
probability, is due to a number of factors amongst which we will mention the 
extent of the sacrifices accepted to enter the group (initiation rites, trials, 
hierarchization and isolation of collectives); weaker or stronger group 
socialization, that translates especially into the reinforcement of emotional 
attachment, which varies as a function of the degree of renunciation of social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Klandermans and others (1997, 2004 ; Klandermans and Mayer 2006) have introduced the supply 
and demand metaphor to explain participation in movement organizations, distinguishing between 
identity, ideological and rational motives. However, such distinctions are far too simple to account for the 
complex interrelations between organizations and individuals and fall short of establishing how the 
three range of motives are produced and do coexist in a process. See for example Tarrow and Tilly 
(2007) for a critic of the lack of a theoretical model that summarizes and links micro and meso levels 
factors. 
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relations external to the group (networks of family and friends); and finally 
the rules in place at the time of the defection, sometimes rendered impossible 
by material dependence or the threat of being pursued as a traitor. » (Fillieule 
and Bennani-Chraïbi 2003 : 123).  
To these barriers to defection we must also add the existence of lateral 
possibilities (the opportunities to reconvert acquired resources, the possibility 
of reconnecting with alternative networks of sociability, and so on), and finally 
the degree of social legitimacy of defection.  
Forms of defection are extremely variable. They may be isolated or take place 
collectively, such as when a group splinters or an entire affinity group leaves. 
Introvigne (1999, p. 62) distinguishes between defectors, who leave their 
organization in a negotiated fashion and by agreement; apostates, who become 
their organization’s professional enemies; and ordinary leave takers, who 
disappear quietly, and whose disengagement carries no apparent notable cost, 
for either themselves or the organization (1999 : 67). Yet this is a rather 
cursory typology. It needs to be completed by various types of passive 
defection – withdrawal without leaving an organization – and different 
scenarios in which disengagement from an organization is followed, and 
sometimes provoked, by joining another organization or cause. 
 
A process model of disengagement 
A process model of disengagement strikes me as particularily useful today as  
means to build bridges between the two fields of terrorism studies and recent 
trends in the study of contentious politics. It is also one of the most promising 
routes to  build a multi level model of disengagement. 
Until recently, little work has been directly interested in disengagement per 
se, as a process rather than a moment in time. Research has centered on the 
determinants of defection, or the future of ex-activists, but rarely on the 
disengagement process and on what happens within organizations. However, 
two recent edited volumes have paved the way for new developments : one on 
disengagement process in conventional political organizations like unions, 
parties and SMOs (Fillieule 2005) and the other on individual and collective 
disengagement from terrorism (Björgo and Horgan 2009). Horgan’s model is 
quite similar to the perspective I am advocating, despite quite different 
theoretical underpinnings and epistemological foundations4. We share four 
basic ideas.  
. First of all, the idea that one should move from « analysis of profiles to 
pathways, and from roots (as in root causes) to route.» (Horgan 2008 and 
2009 : XXIII. See also Crenshaw 2000).  
. Following this, the idea that one should abandon a logic of causal explanation, 
solely attached to singling out the determinants of violent trajectories, in order 
to concentrate on the process by which people join radical organizations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 One can find this model exposed in Taylor and Horgan, 2006. The basic ideas of this model are the 
following : « 1. There is never one route to terrorism, but rather there are individual routes, and 
furthermore those routes and activities as experienced by the individual change over time (hence the 
idea of a process) ; 2. Terrorism works at both an individual and political level, through behaviour acting 
on the environment sustained and focused by ideology, and the effect of that on subsequent behaviour; 3. 
The significant element in strengthening engagement with terrorism and giving it direction is the 
increased role of the social-political-organisational context (and especially as expressed through 
ideology) in exerting control over behaviour » (ibidem : 597). 
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remain involved and/or disengage.  
. Third, the methodological principle that we must first investigate the 
individuals and their life story and then question the manner in which their 
existence is partly determined by structural factors at the meso and macro 
levels. Which means adopting the framework of a comprehensive sociology, 
attentive to the justifications of the actors.5  
. Fourth, the idea that militant trajectories can only be understood through a 
multi-level analysis which articulates the micro level of  the individual to the 
group and broader network to which he or she belongs and broader socio-
political context (see also Hairgrove and McLead 2008).  
 
I fully agree on these four methodological and epistemological principles. 
However, while I share this perspective on the appropriate objectives and the 
empirical ways to attain them, I am considerably less convinced by the 
theoretical foundations of an approach I consider much too eclectic which, in 
the field of social psychology, borrows simultaneously from deviant behavior 
theories (Sutherland and Cressey 1966), social learning theory (Hundeide 
2003) and Merton’s role theory (Fuchs-Ebaugh 1989). In particular, it seems 
to me that one should find a clearer delineation of the three levels of 
idiosyncracies, organizations and contexts. More precisely, the notion of 
« community of practice » which is at the core of Horgan’s model (Taylor and 
Horgan 1986 ; Horgan 2009) and refers to the shared exercise of social 
learning and the related social and cultural practices that develop between 
and within groups, seems far less heuristic to us to analyze one fundamental 
aspect of militant trajectories, i.e. secondary socialization or what we call 
« organizational modeling ». In my own conception, two elements are central.  
 
First, I consider that violent commitments, as well as disengagement from 
radical organizations, should be understood as the result of a process more 
than the product of a precipitating event. Approaches that are based on an 
analysis of deep psychological motivations or stick to the simplifications of 
rational choice theory can not understand the process of commitment. Indeed, 
people often act on purpose but without a fully formed intention, in the sense 
of a balanced appreciation of the possible costs and consequences of their 
actions. As John Searle states, « intention-in-action » is not equivalent to 
« intention to act ». The analytical language of ‘motivations’ which is polluted 
by intentionalism, is too often used as a substitute for ‘thick description’ of 
what actually happened. In fact, people are often forced to act violently 
because of a number of explicit (e.g. tying devices) or implicit (e.g. the 
strenght of ‘role taking’ into a close-knit group) pressures, which means that 
actors are not always ‘purposeful agents’ but can be ‘subjects’, as brilliantly 
illustrated by Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) in his critique of Ranajit Guha’s 
analysis of a peasant revolt in colonial India. (1983)6 
These remarks are well in line with the “hypothesis of continuity” suggested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This point is crucial in the field of terrorism studies, where it is often falsely assumed that not talking to 
« terrorists » is a guarantee and a source of scholarly authority.  
6 Chakrabarty criticizes Guha for sticking to an orthodox marxist explanation of the revolt which lead 
him to explain people’s acts in purely strategic terms, when the actors themselves declare to the police 
that they were ‘acted’ by supernatural forces and that they do not understand retrospectively what 
happened to them.  
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by Brigitte Gaïti and Annie Collovald (2006: 39-42), to take account of the 
process by which radicalization and, therefore, the eventual de-radicalization 
of individuals, works. In this they draw upon both the fascinating study that 
Tackett (1996) devoted to the way in which deputies to the Estates General 
progressively became revolutionaries at the start of the French Revolution 
and the analysis produced by Browning (1992) on how “ordinary” German 
soldiers progressively came to systematically eliminate thousands of Polish 
Jews, by shooting them7. This brings us back to one of the strongest principle 
of the Howard Becker approach, that is, that one must stop reasoning in terms 
of “why” and shift to “how it happened,” in other words, to the chain of facts 
that result from specific contemporary causes and are reconfigured as events 
unfold. In sum, “the principle of continuity involves hypotheses about the 
times experienced, comprised of small disjunctions,  changes to routine, 
disparate initiatives, and events perceived as heterogeneous, ephemeral, 
anecdotal, and rationalized in the patchwork reality of the moment, brought 
back to familiar phenomena over which one is in relative control. We see this, 
the temporality of  experience as distinct from the temporality of the process 
of radicalization, reconstructed and homogenized after the fact around 
“origins,” “turning points,”, and “causes and effects” (Gaïti and Collovald 2006: 
35; see also Dobry 1986 and 2010). 
 
Second, the process of disengagement is to be explained as well by 
idiosyncratic as by structural and contextual factors (i.e. the dialectic between 
dispositions and motives of the actors and their structural positions).  Such an 
approach means that one should articulate micro (dispositions, socialization) 
meso (secondary socialization in protest groups, « organizational modeling », 
strength of « role taking » and dependance to the activist group, etc.) and 
macro (political context, repression and opportunities) levels of analysis. In 
other word a multi level approach to political commitment and disengagement. 
Calls for multi-level approaches are more and more frequent in the literature. 
However, scholars often contend themselves to make an analytical distinction 
between three series of factors of commitment or withdrawal at the macro, 
meso and micro levels, without offering a convincing explanation of their joint 
occurrence over time. In my opinion, symbolic interactionism, and more 
precisely in the version articulated by Hans Gerth and Charles Wright Mills 
(1954) and  Howard Becker (1960, 1966) offers a powerful tool for resituating 
commitment process diachronically, within the totality of individual life 
stories, and helps to contextualize individual engagements and exits 
synchronically at both organizational and macro levels, rejecting the 
scholastic opposition between agency and structure8. In such a model, 
activism is conceived as a long-lasting social activity articulated by phases of 
joining, commitment, and defection.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 One can also mention, for an other illustration of the continuity hypothesis, the contemporary revision 
of the usual explanations given for the individual engagement in the extreme violence of the Great War, 
by the culture of war, the brutalization of societies, the soldiers’ consent or the fact of constraint. (e.g. 
Mariot 2003 ; Loez, Mariot 2008). 
8 We do not have space enough to discuss at lenght the reasons why we privilege such a theoretical 
approach of the link between agency and structure and why it seems more appropriate to us in this 
context than other conceptual tool like those elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens or 
Marshall Sahlins. 
	   7	  
Coined by Herbert Blumer in 1937, ‘symbolic interactionism’ is closely linked 
to the social behaviorism of George Herbert Mead. Its subsequent usage 
belongs less to a school of thought than to a wide array of research sharing two 
standpoints: a common conception of the individual and their relation to 
society; and a way of doing research inherited from the Chicago School of 
Sociology (i.e. field work and qualitative methodologies). More precisely, 
symbolic interactionism can be defined as a microsociological and processual 
approach which systematically links the individual and the study of situations 
to broader contextual factors and social order rules and norms. In this 
perspective, not only are individuals and society interdependent but they also 
mutually construct each other. I contend that recent developments in 
research on activism based on the interactionist concept of ‘career’ developed 
by Everett Hughes (1958), Anselm Strauss (1959) and Howard Becker (1960, 
1966) – what I refer to as « the sociology of activist careers » (Fillieule 2001, 
2005, 2010)- is particularly well suited to proposing a theoretical account of 
disengagement process as a multi level phenomenon.  
The notion of career initially developed by Everett Hughes casts the stages of 
access to and exercise of a profession as a series of objective changes of 
position and an associated series of subjective upheavals. As Howard Becker 
stresses, quoting Hughes, the concept of career comes back to two dimensions: 
« In its objective dimension, a career is « a series of statuses and clearly defined 
offices . . . typical sequences of position, achievement, responsibility, and even 
of adventure . . . Subjectively, a career is the moving perspective in which the 
person sees his life as a whole and interprets the meaning of his various 
attributes, actions, and the things which happen to him. » (Hughes 1937 : 409–
410 in Becker 1966 :102) 
This powerful concept allows us to focus on the process and permanent 
dialectic between individual history, social institutions and, more generally, 
context. The outcome is less a case of predicting a state (activism, 
disengagement, and so on) than of rebuilding a sequence of steps, of changes in 
the individual’s behavior and perspectives, in order to understand the 
phenomenon. « Each step requires explanation, and what may operate as a 
cause at one step in the sequence may be of negligible importance at another 
step [ . . . ] In a sense, each explanation constitutes a necessary cause of the 
behavior [ . . . ] The explanation of each step is thus part of the explanation of 
the resulting behavior. » (Becker 1966 :23) 
A career approach consequently involves considering the two essential 
dimensions of social identity: from a diachronic perspective, the 
transformation of identities and the social mechanisms at work in these 
transformations; and from a synchronic perspective, the plurality of life-
spheres in which social actors may be involved : 
Identity shifts : In Mirrors and Masks (1959), Strauss analyses the manner in 
which identities are liable to change permanently, as a function of 
modifications of the social structure and actors’ successive positions in this 
structure, with all that this means for different stages of actor biography in 
terms of the subjective interpretation of the changes experienced. Strauss 
thus analyses what he calls ‘institutionalized changes’ (changes in status 
provoked, for example, by entrance into the workforce, marriage, etc.) and 
‘biographical accidents’ (crises, failures, losses, and so forth), placing 
particular emphasis on the processes of ‘disidentification’ and ‘initiation’ that 
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may produce lasting and irreversible changes in identity, such as in 
representations, attitudes, and motives. 
Plurality of sub-worlds : In Strauss’s work, plurality refers to the idea that 
social actors are embedded in multiple social worlds and sub-worlds that may 
on occasion conflict, and is a fundamental characteristic of contemporary 
social life. Activists are also individuals, inserted in a multiplicity of life-
spheres and therefore permanently subjected to the obligation to submit to 
different norms, rules and logics that, at times, may conflict. In other words, 
the political memberships of individuals are in tension with the other 
involvements of the same individuals. Owing to this plurality of social worlds, 
individuals are governed by heterogeneous and sometimes even contradictory 
principles of socialization that they internalize. We may thus hypothesize that 
each actor incorporates a multiplicity of behavior patterns and habits, 
organized as repertoires, and relevant social contexts that the actor learns to 
distinguish through the totality of previous socializing experiences. 
 
The link between social contexts and systems of disposition significantly 
reduces the value of analyses of the determinants of commitment or 
disengagement based on multivariate treatments which correlate the 
dependent variable with individuals’ social characteristics. The explanatory 
power of social characteristics is established and varies in conjunction with 
the system of competitive interrelations in which they are found. This system 
may be interpreted at three levels. 
First, at the macro level of the political field and social arenas. Depending on 
the social valuation, at a particular point in time and in a particular sector, of a 
particular model of a ‘good activist’, certain social characteristics and 
aptitudes will be devalued or, on the contrary, privileged. Second, there is the 
micro level of biography. As noted above, it is in the succession of encounters 
of social characteristics and variable socialization contexts that aptitudes are 
created. Third, the system of competitive interrelations must also be observed 
at the meso level of organizations. This means understanding how 
organizations, structurally, socially and politically, select and orient individual 
activities, in order to grasp how they differentially relate to their members’ 
social attributes. Kanter (1968) confirms this when she places commitment at 
the intersection of organizational requirements and individual experiences, 
necessitating consideration of the logics of commitment, keeping in mind the 
social context of practical involvement. 
Such a conception of the micro/meso/macro linkage is well in line with a 
configurational approach, which denotes a dynamic pattern in articulating 
different scales of analysis and that was coined by Norbert Elias (1939, 1970) 
when describing certain patterns of relations between human beings as 
‘configuration’. (figuration in German)9 Such a concept contrasts deliberately 
with the dominant explanations of social action by the aims and strategies of 
the actors, as an expression of weltanschauung or by mere interest. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The concept of configuration is key to Elias’ sociology of civilization. He defines these configurations as 
the changing pattern, which players form with each other, relations of suspense, interdependence of 
players and the fluctuating balance of suspense, the to-and-fro of a balance of power (das sich wandelnde 
Muster, das die Spieler miteinander bilden, Spannungsgefüge, Interdependenz der Spieler, und das 
fluktuierende Spannungsgleichgewicht, das Hin und Her einer Machtbalance » (Elias, 1939). 
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In the next two sections, rather than following the usual analytical route by 
describing successively ideological, identity and instrumental factors of 
commitment and disengagement at the macro, meso and micro levels, I 
explore two crucial series of mechanisms to determine their effects on 
individual reasons for withdrawal: the complex effects of organizational 
molding on individuals caught up in radical groups and the ambivalent effects 
of repression and the criminalization of radical activities. To put it clearly, my 
intention is not to offer a general model of disengagement process. Such an 
ambition would be contradictory with a configurational approach which can 
only suggest a number of mechanisms, the combination of which is always 
dependent on situated contexts. However, by examining the effects of 
organizational molding on individuals, we embrace the essence of meso/micro 
interactions, and by studying the effects of repression on individuals, we are at 
the very heart of the complex web of interactions between macro and micro 
levels (the individual effects of repression) and between macro and meso 
levels (effects of repression on organizational forms and strategies). 
 
The Complex Effects of Organizational Molding. 
 
« Forget the profiles, understand the cells » (Hairgrove and McLead  2008: 400). 
« Nobody familiar with the literature would attempt to understand involvement in terrorism 
without looking at group and organizational dynamics. But we have become increasingly 
confused about how to understand the individual (and individual issues) within a multiple 
level analysis of terrorism » (Horgan 2009 : xx) 
 
Obviously, radical organizations vary widely and there is no intention here of 
minimizing these differences. Nevertheless, certain permanent traits of these 
organizations may be discerned in three broad characteristics: first, their 
illegal character and the repression they undergo; secondly, their clandestine 
and reclusive structure; and finally, their relative closing themselves off from 
the legitimate space of social and political struggles and the organizations 
involved in these battles. I offer the hypothesis that these three common 
attributes play a determining role at the individual level in modalities of 
involvement, the forms of its maintenance, and at the end the possibilities and 
means of leaving the organizations. Indeed, these three characteristics 
suppose very strong and peculiar forms of secondary socialization and 
organizational modeling that may have the potential to deeply transform a 
person’s biography, in a similar logic to what Zeitlin nicely coined as the 
« independent psychological effects of activism. » (1967 :241) 10  
It is precisely these socializing mechanisms that Horgan attempts to capture 
by the notion of “community of practice” (2009:13) in order to take account of 
a learning process through repeated social and psychological interactions with 
an ideology and the related social and cultural practices. Within the 
interactionist framework, Hans Gerth and Charles Wright Mills offer a more 
sociological conceptual toolkit to examine the relationships between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This importance of secondary socialization within radical organizations has typically been neglected, 
due to the structuralist orientation adopted by the sociology of social movements, even if periodically, 
some authors underscored the imbalance between research on recruitment by movements and that 
studying the effect of the institution on militants (e.g. Keniston 1968: 353-354; Killian 1973: 36; 
McAdam 1989:123). 
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individuals and institutions (Gerth and Wright Mills, 1954 : 165–191). They 
define an institution as an organization with distinct hierarchical roles to 
which members must conform. The internalization of such roles occurs 
through secondary socialization, the strength of which needs to be studied – 
from conversion and alternation, in the sense used by Berger and Luckmann 
(1966), to strategic and limited adaptations – along with durability, from the 
viewpoint of biographical consequences in all spheres of life. 
This model places the Goffmanian notion of ‘moral career’ at the center of the 
analysis of activism. This refers to the selection of people (to the incentives 
and barriers to joining, and the orientations of activities) and to organizational 
modeling, i.e. the multiple socializing effects of activism, themselves in part 
determined by organizational rules and modes of operation, understood as a 
set of constraints (status, proposed or reserved activities, leadership, and so 
on).  
Organizations do a lot of work in socializing their members, understood as role 
taking, which allows individuals to identify the different roles they face and 
correctly fulfill their customary tasks. This secondary socialization can, at 
times, assume the form of explicit inculcations, the goal of which is to 
homogenize activists’ categories of thought and their way of acting within and 
in the name of the organization. However, know-how and activist wisdom also 
frequently amounts to a ‘practical sense’, what Bourdieu refers to as « the 
anticipated adjustment to the requirements of a field, what the language of 
sports calls the “sense of the game” (like “sense of place”, “the art of 
anticipation”, etc.) », acquired over the course of a « long dialectical process, 
often described as a “vocation”, by which “we make ourselves” according to 
what is making us and we “choose” that by which we are “chosen” » (Bourdieu, 
1980 : 111–112). This process takes place outside of our conscious awareness. 
If, then, an institution « leaves its mark » on social actors who are part of it « by 
modifying their external conduct as well as their private life » (Gerth and 
Wright Mills 1954 : 173), we need to examine both the content and the 
methods of the process of institutional socialization to understand individual 
disengagement process.  
Three different effects of the interactions between meso and micro levels may 
be distinguished: the acquisition of a vision of the world (ideology); the 
acquisition ‘know-how’ and ‘wisdom’ (resources); and the restructuring of 
sociability networks in relation to the construction of individual and collective 
identities (social networks and identities). It is at these three levels that we 
may discern factors explaining disengagement from radical organizations. 
 
Ideology 
Socialization within organizations may bear on the internalization of a vision 
of the world, of the place of the group in this world and one’s place in this 
group. From the outset, it is vital to stress the fact that the strength of an 
ideology is rarely the driving force behind radical involvement but that it 
becomes important in the course of militant activities, under the effect of 
varied processes of indoctrination and sometimes even  “programming.” In 
other words, the adoption of a political line and especially a visceral 
attachment to the cause rarely preceded involvement, and they are only 
acquired gradually.   
It is in the observation of everyday activist practices that one can see how 
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institutions legitimize certain types of discourse and practices to the 
detriment of others, and how, faced with these constraints, members do not all 
have the same resources to modify or renew the dominant ideologies. Here, 
institutional resources (such as the exercise of a formal or informal leadership 
function, a proximity to or membership of leadership circles, and an activist 
legitimacy based on seniority or ‘battle scars’), as well as those beyond the 
rewards offered by the organization (expert ability or moral authority linked, 
for example, to a profession such as religious responsibility, university 
scholar, elected politician, and so on), determine the capacity to resist and 
eventually contest the ideologies imposed by the organization.  
Therefore, in order for us to understand disengagement, we must also examine 
the erosion of this aspect of activist socialization. How do we explain the 
weakening of the organization’s ideological power, which may lead to a 
lessening of the sacrifices one is willing to make for the cause? Here we may 
distinguish two possible levels of determination. 
First, the strength of beliefs may decline due to a change of political climate, 
whether due to the historical exhaustion of a model of commitment, or by a 
backlash and a return to order due to the erosion of the belief in the 
imminence of the revolution. For example, Whalen and Flacks (1989) show 
that after The Vietnam War ended and the repression of leftist movements 
intensified in the US, militant groups began to reevaluate the chances of 
success of the revolutionary project, as well as the cost of commitment. As a 
result, for young activists the question of the ‘personal versus the political’ 
became more important than any other considerations.  
Second, the loss of ideological conviction may also be produced by a rupture of 
the consensus within a movement, the appearance of factions, and eventually 
of splits. The causes may vary, and on this point social psychology has 
produced a great number of fascinating results, especially from the study of 
small groups showing which conditions foster group loyalty. Here, historical 
examples abound. For example in Italy, in the context of the failed Red 
Brigades kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1977, conflicts emerged between the 
groups of prisoners and the external management of the movement, at the 
same time as the state was creating a special category for those who left the 
organization and accepted to collaborate with the State, thus providing 
opportunities for withdrawal and treason (Moretti, 2004). 
 
Resources 
Participation in a protest group may enable the acquisition of multiple 
resources, which obviously vary as a function of the social resources acquired 
in other life-spheres and prior to commitment, and which we will refer to by 
the generic term rewards and will define as the material or symbolic benefits 
individuals think they receive from their commitment. Four main 
characteristics of rewards must be stressed. First, rewards include both 
objective and subjective dimensions; in other words, they are not always 
perceived by actors. Second, they may be both expected prior to commitment 
and pursued afterwards, but also, and perhaps especially for ‘grassroots’ 
activists who do not always expect to acquire significant and tangible rewards, 
they may be discovered in the course of action, produced in some way by the 
activist experience. Third, rewards vary according to the evolution of contexts 
and individual experiences. Fourth, costs are often confused with benefits. 
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Such a definition of rewards makes it difficult to merely link withdrawal from 
radical organizations to a simple disappearance of the expected benefits. Since 
sacrifice is an integral part of the mechanism of attachment, then, as Kanter 
(1968) argues, the more one had to sacrifice to enter the group and remain a 
member, the higher the cost of defection. In other words, the cost of activism 
somehow determines it’s price. Following a mechanism close to the one 
identified in the concept of cognitive dissonance, the more intense the efforts, 
the more difficult it is to recognize the futility of these efforts.  
This draws attention to a certain deficiency in ‘classic’ explanations of 
diminishing rewards which refer only to the evolution of radical organizations, 
such as the increased life constraints due to the strengthening of repression or 
loss of faith in the triumph of the cause. By excluding everything not directly 
related to the area of protest activities (which typically are not further 
explored), it is difficult, for example, to take into account individual defections 
or the crumbling of groups in contexts where there is no change in the 
functioning of the organization and the economy of rewards on offer.  
Beyond organizational reasons, we need first to add a range of factors which 
are linked to the public image of the group, its social legitimacy and the 
accepted justification to the recourse to violence. This is because the value 
accorded to rewards in a particular life-sphere is also related to the value that 
other beneficiaries and society as a whole accord them. As a matter of fact, the 
social value of a cause, as well as ways of contributing to it, may vary as a 
function of the cultural context and its possible transformations. Specifically, 
it is often that social sectors initially assenting to radical movements which 
employ either targeted or random violence may become unfavorable and have 
an effect on the groups’ trajectory, forcing them to retrench and rely on an 
increasingly restricted and vanishing social base. A process that the Egyptian 
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI) experienced after the killing of 62 people in 
Luxor and that Zwerman and Steinhoff (2005) illustrate with respect to leftist 
movements in the 1970s, especially in the cases of Germany and Japan (also 
see Crenshaw 1991 and Gupta 2008 on these trajectories of decline). 
Most importantly, we must keep in mind what we have established previously: 
individuals are involved in a number of social spaces and the perceived 
returns from these different life-spheres are in themselves varying. In each of 
these spaces, individuals are led to adopt specific roles in which they are more 
or less ‘stuck’, and which define various contexts of socialization. With time, 
significant changes may intervene in different spheres of life, constituting 
bifurcations in which certain roles are redistributed and identities 
transformed. This is why analysis of the logic of disengagement must proceed 
through identification, in different life-spheres, of critical moments that can 
translate into a new valuation of the expected rewards, knowing that their 
value in a sphere co-varies with the value attributed to them in all other 
spheres.  
This point is particularly important in understanding the withdrawal of 
radical organizations to the extent that they, due to the repression they 
experience, and, therefore their often clandestine and exclusive character, 
tend to compartmentalize different spheres of life, to a greater or lesser 
degree, and encourage activists to focus on a single field of militancy. This 
double process of compartmentalization and focus may have ambivalent 
effects. First, because it encourages a personal housecleaning and withdrawal 
	   13	  
from social ties within the militant milieu, it contributes to cohesion. Yet, at 
the same time, this retreat to an increasingly confined world can lead to 
burnout and a degeneration of personal relationships (Ross and Gurr 1989 ; 
Della Porta 2009). The literature on small and exclusive groups is here very 
useful to understand to specificities of most of the radical organizations in this 
respect. For example, Lewis Coser (1974) argues that exclusive groups 
require total commitment from their members, which makes conflicts more 
explosive, since they are quite likely to take on an emotional and unrealistic 
cast. As a result, individuals tend to deny them, and thus accumulate tensions. 
Protesting and defection, therefore, become more difficult and tend to be put 
off, but they develop more rapidly and intensely: “the intensity of the conflict 
grows when unrealistic elements are introduced into a realistic conflict. Thus, 
the conflict grows in intensity when participants are led to suppress their 
emotions of hostility and, in return, the accumulation of these feelings will 
aggravate the conflict if they burst out.” (Coser 1974 :48).  
We also need to understand how and according to what logic individuals 
manage their commitment once the rewards it yields are exhausted; whether 
through psychological repression, distancing from or attempts to transform 
their role, or defection. It is at this point that the institutional set ups aiming at 
facilitating or sanctioning defection (Hechter 1987 ; Taylor 1988), the 
strength of the dependence on the role and the existence of lateral 
possibilities, determined notably by the degree of autonomy of life-spheres, 
describe a world of constraints making defection easier or more difficult. And 
it is as much the socializing force of the role that one is leaving as the manner 
in which one leaves, once the departure is finalized or even many years later, 
that best reflects the shift in trajectories and the degree to which the 
biographical consequences of commitment are sustained. 
 
Social Networks and Identities 
It is pretty clear now that socialization within organizations also occurs 
through the degree of redistribution of activists’ relationship networks, in the 
activist sphere, as well as in other social subworlds. Above all, belonging to an 
organization is belonging to a group, with its borders and world of meaning, 
participating in its illusio; it is interacting with other members, at varying 
degrees of regularity; therefore, to belong is to construct a place or an identity 
for oneself.  
Here, Becker’s approach in his article on the notion of “commitment” (1960) 
constitutes a valuable point of departure for exploring the inter-individual 
dynamics of radical groups. One may simply define this concept as a 
psychological state that pushes an individual to remain caught up in an 
organization (sustained participation). Attachment is both prior to 
involvement and the product of the latter, suggesting that beyond the 
motivations for joining, we should focus on the work of the institution in 
producing this attachment. At the end of the 1960s, Kanter proposed a 
typology of specific elements likely to encourage attachment within groups. 
She distinguishes three aspects of attachment: maintenance, cohesion and 
control, the mechanisms of some of which we have already seen.  
The maintenance  of attachment is based on sacrifice, already discussed, and 
investment. This brings us back to the existence of alternatives. The more 
individuals are caught up in a system that is the only one to distribute rewards 
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and costs, the more committed they remain: « when individuals invest their 
resources in one system rather than in other potential paths, they tie their 
rewards and the future usefulness of their resources, in effect, to the success 
of the system, burning other bridges, cutting themselves off other ways too, 
allocate resources » (Kanter 1968 :506).  
The notion of cohesion designates the affective links between individuals and 
emotional attachment. As McCauley and his colleagues  write, « Devotion to 
comrades is not only a force for joining a radical group, it is equally or more a 
barrier to leaving the group »(2008 :422). Two mechanisms are at play in this 
case: renunciation and communion (Kanter, 1968, 1972). Renunciation refers 
to a withdrawal from all social relationships outside the group, with the goal of 
ensuring a maximum of internal cohesion (see also Bittner, 1963; Coser, 
1974). Communion, the ‘we’ feeling, is characteristic of the establishment of a 
unanimity–exclusion dialectic. Here, we find Turner’s and Killian’s very 
Durkheimian observations with respect to the importance of camaraderie and 
the role of ceremonies and rituals in the cohesion of social movements (1957 : 
399, 442. See also Linden and Klandermans (2003) on the importance of 
conformity to the peer group in far-right organizations).  
Cohesion is also assured through means and techniques of control, from the 
most subtle to the most extreme, such as mortification and denial. 
Mortification brings us back to renunciation of one’s desires and interests, to 
the abandonment of a private identity in favor of identification with a group, 
which Goffman develops in his discussion of the total institution based on the 
notion of ‘mortification of the self’, that is, the loss of individuals’ sense of self-
determination when subject to such institutions as the army or religious 
communities. It shows, for example, how the practice of confession, as well as 
self-criticism, the notion of the sin of pride, etc. serve this function of 
mortification and the “effacement of the sense of individual autonomy.” 
(Hoffer 1963 :66). Denial, for it’s part, brings us back to unconditional 
dedication to an authority, to members’ internalization of what the group says 
and wants, what Catherine Leclercq (2005) calls adherence, “in the double 
sense of a merging (‘sticking to’) and a continued allegiance.” 
Overall, it is the manner in which groups structure sociability relations, both 
internally and externally, as much as the placement of individuals in the 
group, that suggests a series of important factors underpinning the logics of 
disengagement.  
 
 
The ambivalent effects of repression on disengagement process  
 
Despite their proliferation, research on repression’s effects on protest, at the 
level of social movement organizations (SMOs) as well as at the micro level of 
individual commitment and disengagement, remain largely inconsistent. For 
some, repression would have a positive effect on mobilization for a number of 
reasons.  (Olivier 1991, Rasler 1996 ; Khawaja, 1993; Bayat, 1997; Bennani-
Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2003, Hafez, 2003 ; Bianco, 2005 ; Francisco, 2005 ;  
Okion, 2006). These all stem from more or less explicit mechanisms of 
radicalization, such as the provocation of “moral shocks” and the generation of 
incidents of emotional mobilization. (Karklins and Peterson 1993 ; Kurzman 
2004 ; Gayer 2009). The level of repression exercised seems crucial in this 
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case. Some scholars suggest a curvilinear relation,  proposing that semi-
repressive regimes are those which generate the most violence, while for 
others, the engines of radicalization are extremely repressive situations. 
(Goodwin 2001 ; Einwohner 2003). Yet, many studies stress how repression 
may decapitate a movement, slowing down activist attempts and putting an 
end to protests. (Gupta et Vinieris 1981 ; Lichbach et Gurr 1981, De Nardo, 
1985 ; Mueller and Weede, 1990 ; Francisco 1996). Overall, the picture that 
emerges from the literature is very confusing. At most, we could suggest that, 
for those proposing different versions of the theory of frustration, repression 
tends to radicalize protesters, while from the perspective of the mobilization of 
resources it would tend to be dissuasive due to an imbalance in the costs, risks 
and advantages of taking action. 
As I argued above, a method for dealing seriously with the question of 
individual effects of repression, consists of articulating the individual 
trajectories to organizational strategies and contexts (multi-level analysis), 
while considering  the gradual unfolding of the course of the interactions 
(process analysis). In this way, we may hope to determine the precise effects 
(specification of relations) and the particular conditions at play 
(contextualization of relations).  
 
Macro and meso effects of repression on the micro level of disengagement 
First of all, at the contextual level, the reinforcement of activism or the 
withdrawal in the face of repression must be related to its specific or 
indiscriminate character (Mason and Krane, 1989). When only the most 
active leaders and militants in a movement are its focus, demobilization of 
occasional militants and simple sympathizers is more likely. In contrast, when 
this happens indiscriminately to all activists, sympathizers, and even the 
population suspected of supporting them, the spread of mobilization, even 
radicalization, is probable. The cases in France are a good illustration of this; 
the policy of “collective responsibility” confronting the FLN have undoubtedly 
played a major role in the commitment of broad sectors of the population to 
the war, or more recently in Algeria in the context of Islamist movements: 
« Reactive and indiscriminate repression of Islamists in Algeria in the context 
of political exclusion contributed to widespread rebellion. The perceived 
injustice of the coup gave Islamist violence legitimacy. The mortal threat posed 
by state repression against Islamist organizations and cadres gave supporters 
of the FIS additional incentive to fight back. The indiscriminate application of 
repression meant that FIS sympathizers could not guarantee their security 
through neutrality.” (Hafez, 2003, p. 82)  
Still, at the contextual level, the individual effects of repression on withdrawal 
partially depend on the manner in which, in a particular time and place, this is 
socially perceived (notably with reference to the memory of past events), both 
in the population at large, in a specific area of social space, and in connection 
to the way individuals are variously caught up in preexisting relations (clans, 
and community networks). Thus, in societies where clan or caste solidarity is 
strongly rooted, rather than encouraging withdrawal, repression may leads to 
block recruitment, while offering the material means to proceed to action 
(mentoring, learning about violence and modes of action, armaments) and 
drastically reducing the domain of what is mentally conceivable (see Post, 
Sprinzak and Denny (2003) on the importance of social settings in terrorist 
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careers). Grogean and Dorronsoro (2004) demonstrate this well in the case of 
the PKK or Kurdish Hezbollah, organizations in which trajectories of 
involvement occur in blocks, mobilizing entire families from the same villages 
and associations. This is not far removed from Dorronsoro’s approach (2001) 
with respect to Afghanistan and the role of qawm11. In the same way, research 
on the IRA (Bosi forthcoming) or ETA (Crettiez 2006) often shows how 
commitment to these organizations takes place within the context of a family 
tradition, fathers frequently playing the role of mentors to enroll their sons, 
and sons often being motivated to be involved to defend the memory of 
relatives who died in combat or were imprisoned. 
At the meso-level of organizations, the monographic literature effectively 
demonstrates the multiple effects of repression on the internal functioning of 
radical organizations. First of all, repression automatically encourages the 
development of clandestine and exclusive organizations (Zald, Ash-Garner 
1987:125-126; and Hafez 2003). Faced with the risk of inflitration, arrest, and 
the dismantling of militant networks, organizations progressively cut 
themselves off from the outside world and adopt strict models of behavior, 
very often leading to an isolation propitious for the building of tightly knit 
emotional communities (Crenshaw, 1981; Laqueur, 1987; Della Porta, 1995). 
Alvarez (2003) effectively demonstrates this in an analysis of the repression 
of the Chilean Communist Party after Pinochet’s coup. Militants went 
underground and created a group prepared for armed struggle, the Frente 
Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez. The author concludes that “the subjectivity of 
clandestineness was an indispensable condition for ‘naming’ a new way of 
being a communist militant, from then on, increasingly linked to the military 
theme” (Alvarez, 2003:16 and 221-222). “The principal characteristics of 
clandestineness have incurred a tendency towards external control and 
disciplinary vigilance with respect to the party’s operational behavior, 
perceived to be the only way to resist the new ‘scientific' methods of the 
dictatorship’s repression” (Alvarez, 2003:23). 
Another central effect of repression on radical organizations is the way they 
contribute to redefining their place within militant spaces, with consequences 
for the opportunities to leave and the constraints affecting withdrawal. The 
trajectories of revolutionary movements in the 1970s in Italy, Germany or 
even Japan provide many such examples. Thus, Sommier reminds us that the 
competition between leftist organizations was a determining factor in the 
Italian escalation, with the militaristic watershed of Potere Operaio and Lotta 
Continua starting in 1972, and the game of higher and higher stakes between 
those from the Brigade and independent actors and then amongst independent 
actors: “the process of radicalization that characterizes the Italian cycle (and 
leads to its exhaustion through defection and a rise in the cost of involvement) 
is largely linked to competitions between groups on the extreme left, as well as 
their confrontation on the street with militants of the extreme right, who will, 
moreover, also be used as part of the strategy of tension to help in the counter-
mobilization by a fringe group of military secret service people (Sommier 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This Afghan terminology refers to any form of solidarity that may be based on kinship, reisdence or 
occupation. Afghans identify themselves by qwam rather than by tribe of nationality. A qawm is usually 
governed by jirga or shura (a council or assembly of elder males). 
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2010; see also Della Porta 1995 and Sommier 1996). In Japan, competition 
assumes an even more critical form, to such a degree that internal struggles 
(the uchigeba) will soon result in more deaths than the repression. (Steinhoff, 
1992 ; Zwerman, Steinhoff and Della Porta 2000 ; Zwerman and Steinhoff 
2005 ; Wakamatsu 2008). 
 
The effects of repression in a process model. The continuity hypothesis  
The logics of interactions between different actors, therefore the temporal 
developement of the relationships between repression and protest, has been 
mainly studied at both the macro and meso levels, especially with the notion of 
cycles of mobilization. Thus, Tarrow (1989) shows that in the mid-1960s, the 
Italian context was especially favorable to the emergence of protest 
movements, giving rise to an ascendant phase of revolt (from 1966 to mid-
1968) and a phase of radicalization (from mid-1968 to1972), following which 
the state unleashed a wave of repression that marked the end of the cycle. In 
this latter phase, new much more radical organizations detached themselves 
from the reform groups who had joined forces with them, and it is there that 
withdrawal first appeared.12 
However, scant research has examined the succession of “micro cohorts” 
(Witthier, 1997) of militants who join and leave organizations at various 
stages of repressive policies. Research on the trajectories of radicalization of 
revolutionary movements in the 1970s under the effect of repression stresses 
that radicalization more readily affects those who did not experience the 
initial phase but joined the movement later, at the peak of the cycle of 
mobilization. This seems to be corroborated by a rise in the levels of violence 
with the second or even third generation of militants (Della Porta, 1995; and 
Sommier, 2010). The reasons are legion. Here we will refer especially to the 
research of Steinhoff and Zwerman (2005), demonstrating that in Japan, as 
well as in the USA, the first generations of militants withdraw generally at the 
moment when repression leads to a development of the clandestine armed 
struggle; they are replaced by others, younger and with quite a different 
profile. In the U.S., the second cohort includes more African-Americans, a 
substantial proportion of working-class members and various minorities, 
recruited from public and community colleges, organizations fighting against 
poverty, and gangs. In Japan, while the movement started amongst 
university-educated elites, it has spread to young workers, marginalized 
members of society and Korean residents born in Japan, who are deprived of 
their civil rights. For the two authors, these social differences definitely 
explain some of the waves of withdrawal and radicalization.  
More generally, this effectively illustrates that, contrary to a homogenous 
vision of collectives, it is necessary to pay attention to two interconnected 
dimensions to understand the diversity of demobilizing effects of repression 
within a single movement: on one hand, the succession of militant generations 
in the center of the analysis of the internal dynamics of recruitment and 
selection, the transformations of collective identities and the organizational 
and ideological changes that result (Fillieule 2001); On the other hand, this 
ebb and flow of militants must be correlated with a historical period that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Sommier (2010) and Zwerman and Steinhoff (2005) on leftist movements in the 1960s in France, 
the U.S. and Japan; as well as Brockett (2005) on the cycles of repression in Guatemala and El Salvador. 
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includes a succession of repressive events. Traumatic episodes, such as the 
killings of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by the Chicago police in December 
1969, or the “battle of Valle Giulia” in Rome on March 1st, 1967, constitute 
“socializing events,” the weight and individual consequences of which depend, 
in fact, on earlier socializing events and the particular generation of militants 
(Bosi forthcoming).  Furthermore, the specific forms the repression takes for a 
given cohort translate into a whole series of socializing effects that lay the 
foundation for generational phenomena. So, analysts often consider the 
experience of prison and torture crucial, as incubators of militancy, serving as 
intense forms of socialization, and indeed a manner of redefining identities 
(Kepel 1994 and Haenni, 2001 on Egypt ; Bucaille 1996 on Palestine; Martinez 
2000 et Labat 1995 on Algeria ; Larzillières 2003, on Chechnya). Finally, the 
importance of the succession of militant generations in understanding the 
individual effects of repression also raises questions about transmission of the 
memory of struggles, which could be disrupted and facilitate withdrawal when 
repression decimates an entire generation, as Bennani-Chraïbi (2003) shows 
with respect to the disappearance of militants from the left and the extreme 
left on Moroccan campuses in the 1970s. 
It is essential here to recognize that individual changes of attitude and conduct  
under the effect of repression do not follow the model of action/reaction but 
are rather part of long and complex process, leading us to the interactionist 
approach in terms of career and the ‘continuity hypothesis’, which helps us 
sociologize and historicize the disruption in individual trajectories through 
restoring the time periods and the sequences of these transformations.  
To sum up, such an interactionist approach to the processes of involvement in 
and  withdrawal from radical organizations also means that it is fruitless to try 
to construct a model for these changes in individual conduct within the 
framework of a rational conception of action. A few refinements that could 
offer explicit models of individual effects of repression based on cost-benefit 
analysis are shown to be particularly inadequate to sufficiently take account of 
the convergences of decisions that only a comprehensive approach attentive to 
the motives advanced by the actors, in association with their structural 
positions at each stage of their trajectory, can help to understand. To the 
extent that involvement in radical activity is usually marked by what Gupta 
(2008)  called acts of “selfish-altruism” and “self-sacrifice,” it is impossible to 
understand withdrawal by merely invoking an exhaustion of the expected 
rewards or a modification in the perception of the chances of success, as, for 
example, Berman and Laitin (1992) do. The examples of “suicide terrorism” 
(Gambetta 2005 ; Pape 2003, 2005 ; Brym and Araj 2006) and voluntary 
immolations (Pettigrew 1997 ; Kim 2002 ; Bozarslan 2004 ; Biggs 2005 ; 
Grogean 2006, 2007 and Crenshaw 2007 for a review) show this quite clearly. 
We can only agree here with Elster (2009) who, in a recent book on the 
disinterest and the dead ends of the rational action theory, explores all the 
explanations produced on the rationality  of suicide missions and finally 
concludes with the complexity of individuals mobile and institutional set ups 
that, at each stage of individual trajectories, can lead militants to become 
involved in the preparation and carrying out of such an action. (See also 
Merari 2005 on the importance of temporal factors in suicide bombings.) 
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In this chapter, I have offered a number of conceptual and methodological 
tools in order to develop a process and multi-level model of disengagement. I 
have illustrated this model by bringing out a certain number of characteristics 
that may be at work in the complex web of interactions between individuals, 
organizations and contexts. Let us summarize these characteristics. 
First, at the macro level, there is the importance of specific contexts and the 
transformations in the structure of commitment and disengagement 
opportunities. The socio-political environment constrains organizational 
evolution at the meso level and shapes activists’ expectations at the micro 
level. These elements are particularily visible in a diachronic perspective 
when one consider the observable differences between cohorts or generations 
of activists (See also Reinares, 2001, Roy, 2004, Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005, 
Viterna 2006). A range of characteristics can be listed here, including the 
state of the commitment offer, the nature of state intervention (or the lack of 
it) in the public policy domain addressed by the mobilized network, and the 
public image of the cause.  
Second, at the meso level of organizations, one must study the extent of the 
development of the mobilized network (territorial spread and numerical 
growth, and therefore the extent of recruitment networks through people that 
know other people), the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the group 
in terms of social-biological and ideological characteristics (which also 
constrain the nature and range of acquaintance networks), and finally the 
degree of ‘openness’ of the groupings studied (the voluntary recruitment 
policy, ways of integrating newcomers into the group, and so on). 
Consideration of all these organizational factors must be articulated to an 
analysis of ‘moral career’, the combination of the effects of selection and 
organizational modeling on the long-term commitment of individuals, in the 
orientation of their activities within the group, and in the forms (the practical 
modalities and the reasons they cite) that eventual disengagement will 
assume. This last point not only stresses the well known studied collective 
incentives (be they positive or negative) that enhance or discourage individual 
participation, but also the great importance of institutional socialization and of 
its libidinal dimension, a dimension which is increasingly stressed by 
contemporary studies in the field of social movements.  
Finally, at the micro level of the individual, we have the importance of 
‘institutionalized changes’ and ‘biographical ruptures’ at different career 
stages. The pivotal nature of the plurality of life-spheres underlines that 
activist organizations are also comprised of individuals who are inserted in a 
variety of social space locations. Activists are thus permanently subject to the 
obligation to comply with different norms, rules, and logic which may 
potentially be in conflict. These different levels of experience may proceed 
simultaneously or successively; for the observer, the difficulty lies in studying 
the succession of events within each order of experience at the same time (the 
structure of each order) and the influence of each level on all the others, and, 
consequently, of course, in studying the dependent variable : activist 
commitment. 
Obviously, our interactionist and configurational approach does not aim to 
offer a definitive conclusion about which factors or combination of factors 
might universally determine disengagement from radical organization. Here 
we fully agree with Horgan when he writes that « while we might aspire to 
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developing a scientific study of terrorist behavior, exploration (let alone 
description) might be a more noble and realistic achievement than true 
explanation at this point. The nature of this exploration may be empirical, but 
it is important to accurately reflect on the scientific limitations of our enquiry, 
at whatever level we  operate as academic researchers ». (2009 : xxii)  
However, we propose a set of methodological recommendations for those who 
ambition to implement a process and multi-level model of commitment and 
disengagement. These recommendations will ultimately boil down to five 
components: 
- Move away from reasoning in terms of « independent » and « dependent » 
variables, in favor of a « thick description » of the observed phenomena. This 
does not mean that we must renounce to any causal explanation. But that this 
can be achieved only after an analysis of series of mechanisms whose 
composition (in time and in space), produces observable effects, e.g. 
disengagement. 
- Move away from mono causal explanations by discerning factors explaining 
individual behavior at the three interrelated micro-meso, micro-macro and 
meso-macro levels  of observation. 
- Move away from synchronic mechanisms towards diachronic variations with 
regard to context change, organizational transformations, and individual life 
course. 
- Move away from models which suggest that individuals are either always 
strategic and rational, or the mere plaything of psychological or structural 
forces. One should try to overcome the far too simplistic analytical distinction 
between instrumental, solidarity or ideological motives. If such incentives are 
obviously at play in commitment and disengagement process, they certainly 
can’t be used as a classification for characterizing different types of individual 
paths towards activism or, even worse, for building movements’ typologies. 
The complex way interactionist sociology and configurational approach define 
individual entities and the links between agency and structure are of great 
help here. 
- Focuss research on the individual level – i.e. one’s life course and the 
justifications they give for their actions- as a mean to investigate the complex 
interplay between micro, meso and macro levels. If such a recommendation 
implies that the biographical material is certainly the most suitable source to 
relate the meso and macro conditions to individuals’ motives, it remains that 
activists are always caught in social ties and organizational bounds at the 
meso level. Which means that it is virtually not possible to isolate the micro 
level of the meso level. 
These five recommendations should help us to go farther than the structuro-
functionalist generalizations of much of the sociology of social movements as 
well as the normative approximations of many psycho-sociological 
approaches. 
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